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Abstract 
Using a large sample of Italian small and medium enterprises (SMEs), we investigate the effect of 
membership in a formal business network (“contratto di rete”) on firms’ economic performance. We 
find that network participation has a positive effect on value added and exports, but not on 
profitability. The advantages of networking are stronger in the case of: smaller SMEs, firms operating 
in traditional and in more turbulent markets, firms located in less developed areas and firms not 
already exploiting the weaker ties offered by industrial districts. Network characteristics, such as size, 
geographical dispersion and diversity, are also found to influence performance.  
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1. Introduction 
Firms, as social and economic actors, are members of numerous networks, which can be 
formal or informal, structured or de-structured, managed or not managed. The economic and 
managerial literature substantially agrees on the presence of positive economic returns from 
those interactions, arguing that isolated firms show, systematically, a worse performance with 
respect to firms that interact with each other. Networking activities of firms have been 
extensively investigated in the entrepreneurial and managerial fields, from both a theoretical 
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and empirical perspective. Two main fields of investigation have emerged within network 
research, as Hoang and Antoncic (2003) highlight: the first analyzes the impact of networking 
on firms’ performances, while the second considers the main factors influencing networks 
formation and functioning. Several surveys and quantitative analyses have been accompanied 
by a parallel and extensive qualitative research aimed at explaining the contents and nature of 
the relationships (Jack, 2010). Being a member of a network can be an important source of 
competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998), may allow one to gain access to knowledge 
and resources at lower costs (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Zaheer and Bell, 2005) and to benefit 
from scale economies without the disadvantages of the big dimension (Watson, 2007). 
However, despite the wide theoretical and empirical research on the positive effects of 
networking on performance, large-scale empirical analyses are still scarce and the results are 
often poorly comparable, as highlighted by Oliver and Ebers (1998). The definition of firms’ 
network is one of the most problematic aspects that emerge by analyzing the literature. 
Networking is often a self-reported activity that may refer to a continuum of interactions and 
collaboration levels. When networks are clearly defined and properly observable, their effects 
on firm performance are often contaminated by other non-network aspects, and hence difficult 
to isolate. The recent contribution by Schoonjans et al. (2013), for instance, analyzes the 
effect of formal networks identified through the participation to a Flemish government 
program based on managers’ training and structured contacts among managers of small firms 
and large corporations, in a context where the effect of networking per se is mixed with the 
training effect.  
Our paper contributes to this debate in several ways. First, we adopt a clear-cut definition of 
business-to-business formal network, which is more stringent than the classical definition 
given by Parker (2008), according to which a business network is a group of entrepreneurs 
that voluntary share knowledge and experiences. In our case, the relationships among firms in 
the network are closer, have clear objectives and respect a specific contractual scheme, named 
“reti d’impresa”, recently introduced in Italy. Firms enter this type of legal contract 
voluntarily with the explicit aim of co-producing, co-marketing, co-purchasing or co-
operating in product or market development, echoing the strong definition of formal network 
introduced by Huggins (2001). Such a contractual instrument has been introduced to favor the 
formalization of cooperation and collaboration among firms with the goals of partially 
overcoming the limits of small businesses and increasing the potential economic gains for 
network members, which are organized in formal groups with specific objectives (e.g., 
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Huggins, 2000). Second, we consider a pure network effect because firms explicitly decide to 
sign the network contract agreements without receiving any other kind of relevant support, 
training or facilities from the government. Therefore, the identified effect is only related to 
organizational, technical and competitive advantages from firms’ cooperation in production or 
marketing, and is not mixed with the effect of other policy measures (e.g., sponsored 
training). Third, our analysis is one of the few that relies on longitudinal data and firm fixed-
effect methods. In doing so, we aim at eliminating the potential bias in estimates arising from 
self-selection of specific firm types into networking due to unobservable firm characteristics, 
such as a firm’s specific culture, the management style or the owners’ preferences. Finally, we 
provide new empirical evidence on the effects of network membership and its interactions 
with the external context, based on a large-scale econometric analysis. While doing so, we 
also shed light on some hitherto under-explored interactions between formal networking and 
the external context. Specifically, we test whether the advantages of networking are stronger 
for firms not already exploiting the weaker ties offered by industrial districts, and whether a 
differentiated effect of networking emerges when this unfolds in economic environments 
characterized by higher uncertainty and volatility, where the information-sharing channel of 
networking ought to be particularly valuable. To the best of our knowledge, this latter 
dimension of heterogeneity has never been explored before in the literature.  
We obtain our data by merging economic and financial information for a large representative 
sample of Italian incorporated businesses with information on their membership status in a 
formal network, covering the years from 2010 to 2014 and forming a longitudinal firm 
sample. We then investigate the effects of network participation on different measure of 
performances in the short and medium term, with the idea that networking can create benefits 
even in the short run. We focus on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) for the relevance of 
small business in Italy in comparison to other European countries, for their lower 
personalization of business as compared to micro firms (for which the importance of personal 
social ties is instead high) and for their simpler functioning as compared to inter-firm 
relationships among large companies.
1
 Our findings show that network agreements increase 
the value added per unit of sales, a proxy for the capacity of the firm to manufacture goods 
and provide services and sell them to the market, as well as the export propensity of 
participating firms, while the effects on profits are found to be negligible. After splitting our 
sample according to specific external factors, interesting differences emerge: the network 
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effect is stronger for small SMEs, and for firms located in underdeveloped areas or operating 
into more traditional sectors. Moreover, we find that formal networking acts as an effective 
tool for enhancing the performance of firms operating outside traditional industrial clusters 
and in more turbulent markets (measured by a strong industry-wide volatility of sales), where 
collecting or sharing information is expected to be particularly important.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
networking and economic performance and describes the specific Italian context. Section 3 
presents our hypotheses and the main methodological concerns, while Section 4 describes our 
database. Section 5 presents and discusses our main results, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 A definition of formal business networks  
How to define a network of firms, as well as the content of the network relationship itself, are 
controversial points in the literature. Often, business networks have been defined as general 
entities, where information is shared without any kind of specific interactions or relationship. 
Clusters of firms, for example, represent probably the weaker definition of a formal network, 
where mild ties among entrepreneurs and general inter-firms linkages within the industrial 
clusters are the instruments for supporting cooperation, innovation and sharing information 
flows (Li et al., 2015; Villa, 2007). In that definition of formal business networks, the 
interactions among firms are secondary and only rarely based on a direct relationship in the 
operational activities. Similarly, formal business networks based on weak operational 
interactions are identified by other authors like Birley (1985), Chell and Baines (2000) or 
Robson and Bennet (2000). In such cases, entrepreneurs interact with each other indirectly, 
through the mediation of institutions like chambers of commerce, governments, specialized 
agencies or trade organizations, which act as useful instruments to promote information 
sharing or exchange of experiences. However, one of the most important aspects of 
networking is an explicit voluntary adhesion and a direct interaction, as highlighted by Parker 
(2008), who defines formal business networks as organizations that bring together 
entrepreneurs with the aim of sharing information and experiences for mutual advantage. 
Other authors adopt a more restrictive view of formal business networks, by defining them as 
“initiatives to bring together firms to co-produce, co-market, co-purchase or co-operate in 
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product or market development trough contractual agreements” (Huggins, 2001).2 Such a 
narrower definition guarantees the effective willingness of members to cooperate and 
represents one of the main differences between the objectives of our study, focused on formal 
networks of firms aimed at operating together, and those of studies focusing on other types of 
networks.  
2.2 Networks and members’ performances 
The long-standing idea that belonging to a network is beneficial for firms has been the focus 
of a large literature in the managerial, entrepreneurial and economic fields. There are several 
channels through which networking can sustain performance. Networking reduces transaction 
costs (Lin and Lin, 2016), can supply firms with resources in a flexible manner and at a 
reduced cost (Li et al., 2015), can facilitate knowledge flows and technological improvements 
(Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009), as well as help to stimulate product or process innovation (Schott 
and Jensen, 2016; Mazzola et al., 2016).  However, despite a strong convergence on the 
general positive effects of networking on performances, the empirical results are still strongly 
dependent on the specific definition of network, on the kind of firms analyzed and on the 
economic context. The general consensus on the positive effect of networks is mainly driven 
by the results for SMEs, as recently argued by Schoonjans et al., (2013), but is mixed for 
weak formal (Park et al., 2010; Watson, 2011) and informal networks (Kingsley and Malecki, 
2004), as well as for cooperations among larger firms (Koka and Prescott, 2008).  
In the case of formal business networks created on strong voluntary basis, firms truly decide 
to cooperate in production or marketing and their relationship configures itself as a strong tie 
in the relational-structural embeddedness framework (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1998). 
Frequent interactions, common or explicit objectives and closeness among firms increase 
reciprocal trust, reduce opportunistic behavior and facilitate operational advantages of 
networking, especially for small and medium firms (Julien, 1995). Schoonjans et al., (2013) 
present the larger panel analysis on the networking effect available in the literatures and adopt 
the fixed-effect estimator to reduce endogeneity concerns. Focusing on the whole population 
of East-Flander SMEs (less than 250 employees) during the period 1992-2008, they analyze 
the effect of a government program, named PLATO, aimed at favoring contacts among SMEs 
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managers also by organizing training sessions and discussions with large firms’ managers. 
They find a positive and significant effect of networking on net assets growth and on value 
added growth (+2% and +3%, respectively), but the networking and managers’ training 
effects are likely to mix with one another. Using survey data on Australian SMEs in the 
period 1994-1997, Watson (2011) considers firms linked to weak formal networks (industry 
associations, business consultants or banks) and to strong informal networks (other firms in 
the industry, family and friends) and find that only some specific types of formal networks 
(i.e. business consultants) have significant effects on firms’ survival and growth. Park et al., 
(2010), analyzing a large sample of manufacturing firms in Korea (mainly SMEs) in the 
period 1994-2003, find evidence that networking (i.e. industrial clustering) has a positive 
effect on sales growth and survival, while other types of interactions (i.e. subcontracting) have 
a negligible effect. Watson (2007) proposes one of the largest cross-sectional studies, using 
data on Australian SMEs with less than 200 employees. Formal networks are defined as 
relationships with external accountants or industrial associations. He finds that firms involved 
in weak formal networks have higher survival probabilities and higher economic 
performances (in terms of the probability of being over the 25
th
 percentile of ROA and sales 
growth). Lechner et al., (2006) use data from a survey study on CEOs and founders of venture 
capital firms (small firms by definition), and find a general positive effect of networking on 
firm development and sale levels. Their data on networks, which are self-reported by 
respondents, include both formal networks (technological alliances, marketing information 
networks) and informal networks (friends, other firms). Havnes and Senneseth (2001), 
analyzing a sample of more than 1700 SMEs operating in eight different European countries, 
find no benefits from networking
3
 in the short run in terms of employment or sales growth. 
However, in the long term, firms involved in alliances and networks show an increasing 
geographical extension of their market. 
The evidence for large firms is less clear-cut, probably because of the complex objects of the 
relationships, often focused on complex technological cooperation rather than on simpler 
synergies in production, commercialization or market development. Positive effects on profits 
(measured by a scale variable condensing market performances) are found by Ritala (2012) 
for collaboration among competing firms in Sweden, but the evidence is only based on firms 
employing more than 100 workers. Mixed results are instead reported by Koka and Prescott 
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(2008), who analyze formal alliances among medium and large firms in the steel industry in 
40 different countries, using sales per employees as a performance measure. By applying a 
random-effect panel estimation
4
, they find that firms benefit from alliances in relatively stable 
environments, while in periods of radical changes, networks are negatively related with 
performance.  
The empirical evidence for Italian firms, mainly drawn from institutional-level studies, is 
scarce and often inconclusive. Bentivogli et al. (2013) propose an analysis of the determinants 
of networking, using a sample of 1,000 firms involved in formal network agreements. They 
estimate a Probit model for the probability of entering such contracts, and find that firms 
located in Southern or North-Eastern regions of the country, as well as firms characterized by 
larger size and larger revenue growth have a higher probability of entering network 
agreements. Colombo et al. (2014) propose the first investigation on the effects of formal 
network agreement (“reti d’impresa”) on performance. Using a sample of 6,000 network 
firms and 70,000 non-network firms, they show that the probability of having EBIT 
improvements is positively (even if marginally significant) related to networking, while no 
effect emerges on sales growth. More recently, Confindustria (2016), by applying a 
propensity score matching to control for observable characteristics influencing networking 
decisions, argued that firms entering formal network agreements are more productive (in 
terms of Value added per worker) as well as more oriented to foreign markets. Notice, 
however, that these existing studies for Italy rely on cross-sectional data and have been unable 
to employ methods (e.g., instrumental variable or fixed-effect estimation) to control for self-
selection into networking due to unobservable characteristics. 
2.3 Network characteristics and economic outcomes 
According to the structural embeddedness approach, the characteristics of the network itself 
as well as the different prevailing kinds of ties can be important determinants of networking, 
with also strong interactions with the economic context (Gulati and Higgins, 2003). The 
number and type of prevailing ties (strong versus weak), as well as the content of 
relationships can influence the specific advantage of firms occupying certain positions of the 
network, and therefore their performances. Goerzen and Beamish (2005), investigating the 
relationship between network size and members’ performances, find a clearly positive relation 
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unobservable characteristics that influence both performance and networking propensity. 
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between the number of members and performance. However, Lechner et al., (2006), after 
confirming a positive relationship between network size (measured by the number of 
members) and performance (measured by sales level or by the time-to-break-even) in the 
years after foundation, argue that the explanatory power of network size is limited and can 
only partially explain the final economic outcomes. Conversely, they highlight the importance 
of network type in explaining the link between performance and networking, with 
differentiated results according to the different nature (in terms of reputation, cooperation, 
marketing or technology) of the network alliance. Similarly, Das and Teng (2002) suggest that 
the main characteristics of the network deeply influence the potential benefits for each single 
member from participation, with consequences also on the potential economic return. A 
general result from the theory is that the strength of network ties, sometimes proxied by the 
geographical proximity, matters and increases economic return. Consistent to this view, 
Rowley et al., (2000) find a ROA greater than the industry mean for members of networks 
characterized by high geographical density. On the contrary, Goerzen and Beamish (2005) 
find a negative effect of geographical dispersion on profitability of network members. 
Analyzing survey data from subsidiaries of 580 Japanese MNEs in 1999, they propose a 
conceptual model for identifying the main channels through which network diversity 
influences performance. In particular, they define network diversity according to the number 
of different industries (i.e. members which operate in different sectors) involved in the 
network agreement, finding a negative effect of diversity on ROA, ROI and ROS. The 
negative impact of diversity (measured by heterogeneity in partners’ sizes) on performance 
(measured by sales growth) is also confirmed recently by Parida et al. (2016), who analyze 
survey data from 134 Swedish firms. 
 2.3 The Italian network contract 
In an attempt to stimulate technological innovations and improve the competitiveness of 
SMEs, Italy adopted in 2009 a regulation for “Enterprises network”. Article 3, paragraph 4-
ter, and following of Decree 5/2009 (converted into Law 33 of 2009)
5
 defines the “contratto 
di rete” as a contract allowing two or more enterprises to pursue the goal of individually and 
collectively increase their innovative capacity and market competitiveness. On the basis of a 
shared framework program, enterprises mutually undertake to collaborate, to exchange 
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 The law of April 9, 2009, n. 33, enacting, with amendments, the Law Decree 10 February 2009, n. 5 
concerning urgent measures to support industrial sectors in crisis. The law was amended by Art. 42 of Decree 
78/2010 translated into Law 122/2010 and subsequent amendments. 
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industrial, commercial, technical or technological information or services, or to jointly 
perform one or more activities. As such, the network agreement features a model of legal 
cooperation inspired by the logic of auto-regulation between contracting parties: the 
regulation does not prescribe any particular right or obligation for members, who are free to 
choose the details and specifications of the agreement. 
The flexible normative background is intentionally weak in terms of binding constraints, in 
order to support any kind of collaboration: it allows companies to specify in detail “the 
common program and cooperation procedures between joining enterprises”. The fact that the 
legislator does not state prescriptive rules promotes the creation of heterogeneous kinds of 
network, from horizontal models, where members are similar small and medium enterprises, 
to the more popular vertical model, in which a leading company strengthens the link with its 
suppliers. 
The basic requirements of the network contract include the statement of the strategic goal and 
common scopes in order to reach improvements in terms of innovative capacity and 
competitiveness, the identification of a network program that specifies the activities and 
investments required to implement the strategic goal, as well as the rights and duties of each 
participant (Scagnelli and Cisi, 2015). The establishment of a common budget is not 
mandatory, as well as the definition of a common representative body. The firms can also 
foresee entry and exit rules, and ending conditions for the network. 
3. Hypotheses development and methodology 
According to the literature, entering formal networks stimulates resources and information 
sharing, increases cooperation and coordination along the supply chain, with an expected 
positive effect on performance. Of course, previous contributions use different definitions of 
performance: value added or asset growth (Schoonjans et al., 2013), sales growth (Park et al., 
2010), ROA (Watson, 2007), ROA and ROS (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005), employment and 
sales (Havnes and Senneseth, 2001), with choices mainly suggested by data availability and 
by the focus of the study. We decide, according to data availability, to investigate three main 
aspects, on which the interest, at least in Italy, is stronger: efficiency, profitability and 
capacity of selling abroad. Our first hypothesis on the positive network effects can be split in 
three sub-hypotheses, one for each performance measure:   
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H1: entering formal networks has a positive effect on performance, measured by the value 
added / sales ratio, an indirect measure of efficiency (H1a), profitability (H1b) and 
penetration in foreign markets (H1c). 
The last aspect has been rarely investigated in the literature, partly owing to limited data 
availability. However, the interactions among network partners can help firms characterized 
by low exports to accumulate experience and information, which can be used to increase 
foreign sales. This can be favored also by directly sharing resources, transaction costs and 
risks relative to making business abroad (Lu and Beamish, 2001). Recent contributions, 
reviewed by Fernhaber and Li (2013), are mainly focused on the participation to international 
network agreements, rather than to networking in general. Yu et al. (2011) is one of the rare 
cases focusing on how networking (technological and marketing alliances) can enhance 
international sales by stimulating entrepreneurs or managers to recognize and exploit 
international opportunities.  
According to the structural approach, the context in which firms operate, together with their 
intrinsic characteristics and position in the network, can deeply influence the potential 
outcome, as highlighted by Gulati (1998), Gulati and Higgins (2003), Huggins (2000) and 
Szarka (1990). These aspects have been implicitly investigated in different papers, but 
rigorous empirical tests on the effects of the socio-economic environment and on different 
network characteristics on members’ economic performances are still lacking.  
We propose different hypotheses on different structural aspects that can influence the 
economic outcome of networking. Firstly, we think that structural differences among firms 
can influence both the motivation and the economic impact of networking. We test such idea 
empirically by dividing small and medium SMEs. In fact, larger SMEs (i.e. with more than 50 
employees) can already exploit some benefits from scale economies, while smaller SMEs can 
benefit more from sharing resources in operational activities so as to overcome inefficiencies 
due to small size. On the contrary, larger SMEs may be more interested in sharing experiences 
or resources for making business abroad and opening new opportunities. This motivates our 
second hypothesis.   
H2: Small firms enter networks to reduce costs, while medium firms enter networks mainly to 
open new opportunities in foreign markets.  
It is well known that the Italian socio-economic environment is very different across regions, 
with a strong economic and historical divide between the North and the South. The lack of 
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resources or infrastructures of southern regions can stimulate the decision of entering 
networks for preventing isolation, and the potential benefits from being a network member 
may be stronger in underdeveloped areas due to the lower possibility of undertaking informal 
networking. We also identify the turbulence of firms’ relevant markets by computing the 
volatility of sales at a very fine-grained industry level. We expect that firms operating in more 
uncertain environments obtain higher returns from formal networking, as these are the settings 
where access to additional information and resources is particularly valuable. This motivates 
our third hypothesis that, as far as we know, has never been tested before. 
H3: Firms which operate in less favorable environments (i.e. underdeveloped areas or 
turbulent sectors) are expected to obtain higher returns from networking. 
Other aspects related to the external operating and technological environment can strongly 
influence the benefits from networking. According to previous works, networks facilitate 
knowledge flows, (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009), product or process innovation (Schott and 
Jensen, 2016) and new product development (Mazzola et al., 2016). Therefore, networking in 
more innovative industries may be more beneficial for firms. Using the well known Pavitt’s 
taxonomy, we are able to classify industries according to their technological/innovative 
content and test empirically if firms operating in more innovative context show systematically 
higher returns from networking. 
H4: Firms operating in more innovative industries show systematic higher returns from 
networking. 
As highlighted in the literature review, previous works often find a positive outcome also 
from weaker forms of firm-level cooperation, like in the case of industrial clusters (Li et al., 
2015). However, the presence of different networks has been rarely considered. Probably, 
Watson (2011) is one of the first contributions that jointly considers different kind of 
networks (i.e. banks, solicitors, industry associations and business consultants), confirming 
that most of the effects on firms’ growth come from formal networking. The formal 
agreement we analyze (reti d’impresa) may overlap with other kinds of weaker formal 
networks (or even with informal networks). In such cases, as the firms involved may already 
be able to access valuable information and resource through the weaker form of networking, 
we expect the effect of contractual network agreement to be smaller. In fact, the Italian 
production system, characterized by some specific geographical areas with strong industrial 
specialization (i.e. industrial districts or clusters) may offer a unique opportunity for 
investigating the interaction between strong formal ties and weak formal or informal ties.  
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H5: Firms located within industrial districts are benefiting less from contractual network 
agreements.  
Finally, the structure of the network is expected to deeply influence the economic outcome for 
members (Das and Teng, 2002). On the basis of previous works, we decide to focus on three 
aspects: network size, network geographical dispersion and network diversity (measured by 
the prevailing activities of network members). According to the literature, we expect a 
positive effect for large networks (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Lechner et al, 2006) because 
of the growing number of ties and of potential information/resources to be shared. A negative 
effect is expected for geographical dispersion (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005), due to the 
weakening of ties as far as the distance increases. Finally, a large network diversity (Goerzen 
and Beamish, 2005; Parida et al., 2016) is expected to increase coordination costs, which 
impacts negatively on performance. Therefore, our last three hypotheses are the following: 
H6: Network size has a positive effect on performance (H6a), while network dispersion, in 
geographical terms, and network diversity, in terms of the different activities of members, are 
negatively related to performance (H6b and H6c, respectively). 
 
3.1 The empirical model 
To empirically test our hypotheses, we consider the following regression model, applied on a 
very large and representative sample of Italian SMEs, for which we have complete financial 
statement data: 
                               (1) 
where     represents the selected measure of performance (value added ratio, profits or export 
propensity) and       is a dummy variable identifying the networking status that changes 
over time, and becomes active the year after the firm enters a network agreement.     is a 
vector of firm-level time-variant controls, including standard indicators able to explain 
performance such as firm size, age, capital intensity and degree of vertical integration.    is a 
vector of year fixed effects (i.e. dummies for the specific year of analysis) aimed at catching 
macroeconomic determinants of performance. The last part of the equation,        , 
indicates the error term: the first component     is correlated with the presence of network 
alliances, while the second component     is a purely white noise error term.  
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The most recent economic literature on networks starts highlighting potential endogeneity 
problems regarding the relationship between signing network contracts and unobservable 
firms’ characteristics, aspects which were substantially ignored in previous studies trying to 
estimate the economic outcomes of networking. Bodnaruk et al. (2013) argue that the 
probability of engaging in business alliances, and then to participate to network agreements, is 
strongly influenced by the quality of corporate governance. The latter strictly depends on the 
quality and ability of managers (or of owners in case of small firms without managers), so that 
the identification of the causal effect crucially depends on the possibility to separate these 
unobservable factors, as well as other observable factors, from the presence of network 
alliances.  
As observable controls, equation 1 includes some indicators reflecting differences among 
firms in relation to financial/economic aspects (i.e. size, age, vertical disintegration and 
physical capital intensity). Moreover, we include dummies able to capture structural 
differences in performance, due to regional, time and sectoral specificities. It is more difficult 
to deal with unobservable factors, which enter the error term    , creating potential 
endogeneity problems. Such aspects can be seen as specific features such as the firm tradition 
and culture, or firm “quality”, which substantially coincides with the ability or quality of the 
main decision maker within the firm. Since such unobservable factors undoubtedly influence 
the probability of being involved in network agreements, ignoring them can lead to an over-
estimate of the real causal effect of networking on performance. If we are willing to assume 
that the firm culture or the ability/quality/capacity of the managers are stable over time, any 
potential endogeneity problem can be solved through the inclusion of firm fixed effects in 
equation (1). The model is then estimated through the so called fixed effect estimator based 
on the within group transformation of equation (1), i.e. by demeaning all variables included in 
our econometric models. In this case, the estimated coefficient on the dummy NETit represents 
the effect on performance due to formal network participation.  
Our empirical strategy is based on the estimation of equation (1) for the whole sample (H1) 
and for different subsamples (H2, H3, H4, H5), following different models specification in 
order to test the robustness of the results. The main aspect of interest is the coefficient for the 
dummy variable NETit, in the full sample and for each subsample. All the estimates keep into 
account the panel structure of the database and include firm fixed effects as well as year-
specific fixed effects.  
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For the last hypothesis (H6), we modify our econometric approach. In particular, we run 
separate OLS regressions on the subsample of firms entering a network agreement during the 
period considered. In this case, firms are pre-selected among those firms entering a network, 
and then the potential endogeneity problems are partially mitigated. Since time invariant 
controls (i.e. network characteristics) are not changing over time, we cannot use the fixed 
effect estimator. However, in order to reduce heterogeneity, we saturate our OLS specification 
with controls, using the same variables in the aforementioned     vector, as well as numerous 
industry-year (i.e. two-digit NACE dummies interacted with years) and region-year 
interactions (i.e. regional dummies interacted with years). 
4. Data 
Our main source of information is the INFOCAMERE database on Italian formal network 
agreements, which collects data on all the agreements signed since the introduction of the 
network contract until 31/12/2015. The total number of firms involved in such contracts is 
11,927, while the total number of networks is 2,282. For each contract, we are able to identify 
each member and classify it as self-employer, micro-firm, SME or large firm. We have 
information on the network name, number and identity of partners, main objects of the 
agreement, month and year of the network creation. In order to evaluate the effects of the 
network agreement on performance, we need to recover economic information for each 
member. We decided to focus on SMEs, as highlighted in the introduction, in order to reduce 
heterogeneity and because of the relevance of networking for them. We considered the whole 
population of Italian firms that are compelled to register the balance sheet, i.e. limited 
companies and corporations, and we selected only firms with a number of employees between 
10 and 250. Using the tax code as a firm identifier, we matched the INFOCAMERE data with 
the AIDA dataset (provided by Bureau Van Dijk) which contains the balance sheets of all 
Italian firms.  Notice that, for each firm in the AIDA database that enters a network 
agreement, we have information on the whole network, even if for some members we do not 
have financial data. Finally, we completed the economic information by merging data on 
international sales included in the ISTAT-COEWEB dataset at individual level, using again 
the tax code as a firm identifier.  
We were able to collect financial statement information for the period 2008-2014 for a sample 
of 167,622 firms. We structured our database as an unbalanced panel, using all available 
information on Italian SMEs. All the monetary values are deflated according to the Italian 
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Consumer Price Index. Table 1 shows some statistics on the adoption of network agreements 
for the whole population of SMEs that are included in the AIDA database. As it is clear from 
the figures, the most consistent participation to the network agreement is very recent. There 
has been has a jump in 2012, and the small number of firms participating to the networks is 
one of the main drawbacks of our analysis.  
Table1: Number of SMEs participating to the Italian network agreement 
Year 
Networking 
SMEs 
Networking 
incidence 
N. of New 
networks 
Networks at the 
end of the year 
2010 28 0.02% 13 13 
2011 311 0.2% 120 133 
2012 979 0.6% 274 407 
2013 1,921 1.4% 452 859 
2014 2,558 1.9% 316 1,175 
Total 5,797 0.6% 1,175   
 
Even if the network agreement is immediately effective, it is reasonable to assume that its 
economic effects take some time to emerge: it is very difficult that a formal network officially 
born during the year can materialize its effect before the end of the year. Therefore, we 
consider the year of the contract as a sort of “transition period”, where the network has been 
formed, but its effects cannot influence the balance sheets, irrespective of the month in which 
the contract has been signed. The financial variables relative to such year have been classified 
as “pre-network” observations, but the results are substantially stable if we treat such 
observations as missing values.   
Given the large dimension of the database and the presence of unreliable or incomplete 
balance sheet data, a careful process of data cleaning has been applied. First, firms that 
became inactive during the period, as well as firms involved in liquidation processes, have 
been excluded from the sample for the entire period of investigation. Moreover, we devoted 
particular attention to outliers reporting unreliable or out-of-scale balance sheet data: we 
exclude all firm-year observations reporting negative value added as well as value added too 
large in comparison to the other balance sheet dimensions (for instance over the 99
th
 
percentile in term of value added per unit of revenues and value added per unit of labor cost). 
Finally, only geographical areas (Italian provinces) and industries (at two-digit NACE 
disaggregation) where at least one network agreement has been signed (i.e. when a firm in 
such province/industry enters a formal network) have been considered.  We use complete 
information on each network, even if only corporations and limited companies can be used for 
evaluating the effects of networking on performance. In this vein, we create specific 
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indicators considering all network members, including micro-firms, self-employees as well as 
large corporations. First, we count the total number of network members to create an indicator 
of network size. Secondly, we compute an index representing the geographical dispersion in 
terms of number of provinces, given by the ratio of the number of provinces over the total 
number of network members. Thirdly, we generate another indicator representing the network 
dispersion along the value chain that has been computed using information on the activity 
code (NACE) for each member. As in the previous case, we use the ratio of the number of 
two-digit sectors characterizing network members over the number of network members. 
Those indicators, relative to the network itself, have been reported in the last part of table 2, 
with reference to the situation at the end of 2014. In terms of size, 50% of networks show less 
than 6 members, while in terms of geographical dispersion the median network has 18% of 
members located outside the province. Finally, the median network shows at least one 
member operating in a different two-digit NACE code, while very heterogeneous networks 
are less common.  
 
Table 2: Networking phenomena: incidence by size class, area, sectors and network indicators 
  N. Networking firm Network participation rate 
Size Class 
More than 50 employees 346 3.3% 
Less than 250 employees 2,212 1.8% 
   Geographical area 
North West 792 1.7% 
North East 782 2.2% 
Centre 538 1.9% 
South 446 1.8% 
   Pavitt Taxonomy 
Science Based 235 3.7% 
Specialized Suppliers 529 2.9% 
Information Intensive 234 1.9% 
Supplier Dominated 1,096 1.6% 
Others 464 1.7% 
   Total sample 2,558 1.9% 
Network indicators Median 10th percentile 90th percentile 
Network size 6 3 24 
Network dispersion 0.187 0 0.555 
Network diversity 0.373 0 0.666 
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4.1 Variables used in the analysis 
As dependent variables, we use three different measures of performance at the firm level, 
computed according to financial statements and export information. First, we consider an 
indirect measure of efficiency, the value added per unit of revenues, which reflects the 
capacity of the firm to manufacture goods (and provide services) and sell them to the market. 
Secondly, we analyze profitability using the Return of Assets indicator (ROA), computed as 
EBIT margin over Total Assets. ROA is one of the most commonly used measures of 
profitability, and has been already aopted in the networking literature by Goerzen and 
Beamish (2005)
6
.  
Finally, the export share, defined by the ratio of foreign sales over revenues measures the 
capacity to enter foreign markets. Additional control variables are used to partially explain the 
observed heterogeneity of economic performances, and are drawn from the managerial 
literature as well as from empirical studies on the determinants of performance (Nickell et al., 
1997). The aforementioned controls enter gradually in our model specification, in order to test 
the stability of results. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description 
2014 
 
2010 
mean sd   mean sd 
VA ratio (VA/S) Value added / Sales ratio 0.35 0.19 
 
0.33 0.19 
ROA EBIT over total assets 0.04 0.62 
 
0.05 0.25 
Export share (Exp) Export / sales ratio 0.06 0.17 
 
0.06 0.16 
Export share squared 
 
0.03 0.12   0.03 0.11 
Size Ln Sales 14.65 1.28 
 
14.57 1.36 
Size squared 
 
216.26 38.12 
 
214.04 40.32 
Age Years after foundation 21.30 17.51 
 
17.45 18.66 
Vertical disintegration Costs of materials and services over Total costs 0.65 0.20 
 
0.68 0.21 
Physical capital 
intensity Physical Assets over Sales 0.43 1.71 
 
0.42 1.59 
Dummies           
Networking Probability of entering networks 1.90% 
 
0.02% 
Exporting Probability of exporting 25.81%   23.60% 
 
 
                                                          
6
 We also compute ROS (EBIT margin over total sales) as well as ROE (EBIT margin over equity), the most 
popular measures of profitability, and we obtain similar results for all the regressions reported, which are 
available upon request.  
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5. Results 
5.1 Empirical findings on the whole sample of Italian SMEs 
We begin by addressing the first hypothesis on the general effect of networking on 
performance, measured in terms of value added, profitability and export propensity.  The 
effects can be mainly considered as short term impacts, given the recent introduction of the 
specific network agreement in the Italian legislation. Unless otherwise stated, the reported 
estimates are based on specifications that include firm fixed-effect, to account for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity in firms’ divers of performance.  
Table 4, columns 3 through 5, reports the estimates for three specifications which use value 
added per unit of sales as the dependent variable. Firms involved in formal network 
agreements show a higher capacity of producing VA per unit of revenues, as suggested by the 
positive and significant coefficient estimated for the dummy Networking. After a SME signs a 
network contract agreement for cooperating and sharing resources with other peers, its value 
added per unit of revenues increases. The result is robust to different model specifications, 
which always control for firm fixed effects, year specific effects, as well as different time-
variant firm characteristics, among which vertical disintegration, physical capital intensity and 
export propensity.  The effect is limited in terms of magnitude, but positive and always 
statistically significant: after networking, the value added per unit of revenues increases by 
0.005 (half percentage point) in absolute term, with an increase of near 2% in relative terms. 
H1a is, therefore, supported. Size, as expected, shows a positive impact on the value added, 
mainly through efficiency gains due to economies of scale. However, the negative sign 
estimated for size squared suggests that, up to a certain threshold, internal coordination costs 
limit additional gains in value added creation. A firm’s past experience, proxied by the firm’s 
age, represents an important aspect fostering performance, as expected. The negative signs 
recorded for vertical disintegration
7
 and physical capital intensity are also to be expected, 
given the nature of the variables. Vertical disintegration increases when external costs 
increase, with an expected negative effect on value added. The inclusion of that control 
variable is very important because it excludes that the effect on value added is due to different 
vertical structures among firms. Similarly, a higher weight of physical assets implies higher 
amortization and depreciation, which enter negatively in the determination of value added. 
The last two controls, export share and its squared term, show an unexpected pattern. In 
                                                          
7
 The share of external costs (costs for the purchase of components, materials and services) over total costs is a 
well known measure of vertical integration. A higher share reflects the fact that the firm, instead of organizing in 
house most of the activities, relies on contracts with third parties for the supply of inputs and components.  
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general, we expect a positive effect of international sales on competiveness, because only the 
best firms are able to export. Our estimates show a negative sign for the linear term and a 
positive sign for its square, highlighting a U-shaped relation. In the case of low export levels, 
firm are marginal exporters and, probably, selling abroad implies to bear additional costs that 
overcome the positive returns. On the contrary, strong exporters (i.e. when the square term is 
high) are by definition highly competitive and this reflects in higher value added.  
If we move our attention to profitability, the results of networking are substantially 
inconclusive. The sign of estimated coefficients is positive but it is poorly significant and 
suggests that the effect of networking on ROA is negligible. This evidence is substantially 
stable across all different model specifications and is probably motivated by a different 
objective, at least in the short run, of networking and by the presence of some initial costs. 
Profits appear to be higher for more vertically disintegrated firms, for firms using more 
physical assets and for strong exporters, and lower for marginal exporters. H1b is therefore 
not supported by our findings. 
Finally, the last two columns of table 4 report the results of networking effects on export 
propensity, measured as the ratio of exports over total sales. Our estimates show that after 
entering formal business networks, SMEs export a higher share of their revenues, even when 
general time trends have been removed using year fixed effects. The positive coefficient is 
robust across all specifications and is around 0.0062, more than half a percentage point in 
absolute terms. Given the average level of exports, near 6% of total sales in 2014, the network 
participation increases the export share by about 10%. The Italian network agreement seems 
to be a valid instrument for sharing resources, experience and information with the goal of 
improving the firms’ presence in foreign markets, with a strong support to our H1c. The other 
controls show, more or less, the expected sign: a firm’s past experience, proxied by age, 
increases the export propensity and vertical disintegration has a similar impact, suggesting 
that firms which focus more on core activities show higher chances of selling abroad. Finally, 
also in this case, size impacts non-linearly on exports, but the U-shaped relation is now 
inverted: small SMEs show only a limited export capacity, while larger SMEs are associated 
to a higher export propensity. This finding confirms the importance of networking for 
boosting the export potential of Italian small and medium firms. Exporting is still a strategy 
mainly pursued by larger SMEs, but sharing resources and experience through networking 
represents a valid way for enhancing the exporting capacity of small firms, too.  
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Table 4. The effect of network agreements in term of value added, profits and export propensity 
Dependent variables  Value added ratio ROA Export share 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
OLS Fixed-effect OLS Fixed-effect OLS Fixed-effect 
 
  
   
  
  
    
 
  
Networking 0.00402** 0.00611*** 0.00546*** 0.00558*** -0.00374** 0.000341 0.000565 0.000492 0.0115*** 0.00624*** 0.00625*** 
 
(0.0174) (0.00408) (0.00682) (0.00631) (0.0377) (0.840) (0.739) (0.769) (0.0098) (0.00306) (0.00303) 
Size -0.0303*** 0.131*** 0.0831*** 0.0819*** 0.105*** 0.0193 0.0333 0.0336 -0.0315*** -0.0513*** -0.0495*** 
 
(0.00204) (0.00142) (0.000906) (0.00098) (0.003) (0.418) (0.189) (0.183) (0.003) (0.000216) (0.00321) 
Size squared 0.000289 -0.0054*** -0.0036*** -0.0035*** -0.00329*** 0.00124 0.000735 0.000726 0.00184*** 0.00215*** 0.00209*** 
 
(0.123) (0.00011) (0.00151) (0.00172) (00.002) (0.111) (0.362) (0.365) (0.002) (0.00988) (0.000123) 
Age 0.000187*** 0.00386*** 0.00285*** 0.00292*** -0.00027*** -0.0055*** -0.0053*** -0.0053*** 0.004*** 0.00208*** 0.00212*** 
 
(0.00881) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.000002) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.002) (0.000107) (0.00105) 
Vertical disintegr. -0.486*** 
 
-0.125** -0.125** 0.0268*** 
 
0.0310*** 0.0310*** 0.0289*** 
 
0.00481** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.009) 
 
(0.00134) (0.00136) (0.0018) 
 
(0.0112) 
Physical capital int. -0.000561 
 
-0.000676* -0.000677* -0.00178*** 
 
0.00133** 0.00133** -0.004 
 
-0.0157 
 
(0.337) 
 
(0.0567) (0.0564) (0.00088) 
 
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.327) 
 
(0.973) 
Export share -0.0690*** 
  
-0.0600*** -0.0621*** 
  
-0.0326***   
  
 
(0.0001) 
  
(0.00463) (0.002) 
  
(0.00231)   
  Export share squared 0.0797*** 
  
0.0466*** 0.0852*** 
  
0.0500***   
  
 
(0.0002) 
  
(0.00011) (0.00001) 
  
(0.00365)   
  Industry fixed effect Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No No 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm's fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant 1.072*** -0.475*** -0.0669 -0.0599 -0.786*** -0.397** -0.519** -0.520** 0.0470*** 0.305*** 0.290*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.00945) (0.627) (0.661) (0.0004) (0.0357) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.00462) (0.00612) (0.00018) 
R-squared 0.654 0.027 0.090 0.091 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.232 0.020 0.020 
Observations 946,997 
Number of cf 167,622 
Robust p-values in parentheses. Standard Errors are clustered by two-digit NACE Code, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Summarizing, two of the three measures of performances exhibit a positive and significant 
link to formal networking, providing support for H1a and H1c.
8
 
 
5.2 Differences across firms 
 
Even if we limit our analysis to small and medium firms, it is clear that objectives and 
characteristics among firms that employ 10 workers and firms that employ 200 workers 
may diverge. Therefore, also the main motivations or networking-drivers may be 
remarkably different. We focus on this aspect by splitting our sample of SMEs into two 
groups, identifying small (up to 50 employees) and large SMEs (between 50-250 
employees).  
As shown in table 5, the empirical evidence is supportive of a different impact for the two 
subgroups. The evidence on value added per unit of sales seems to be driven by the 
subsample of small SMEs. The coefficient (0.0067) is larger than the one reported for the 
whole sample (0.0055), and the statistical significance is higher, too. For the subsample of 
large SMEs, instead, the sign is negative, but not statistically significant, suggesting that 
the main effect of networking is not on value added. While the effect of networks on 
profits remains negligible for both subsamples, the impact on exports is found to be 
stronger for larger SMEs (0.017 as compared to 0.006 for the total sample), and weaker 
(0.003 as compared to 0.006) for smaller SMEs.  
However, networking is confirmed as a process helping to increase exports at each firm 
size, even if the effect is very strong (+25% in relative terms) for more structured SMEs, 
which probably enter networks with the explicit aim of finding new markets. Our second 
hypothesis, H2 is substantially confirmed: the effect on VA/S is stronger for small sized 
firms, while exporting advantages are common to both small and larger SMEs. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 For comparisons, in Table 4 we also report the results of simple OLS models, pooling all firms and year 
observations. While the FE and OLS estimates are not very different in the case of value added, the impact of 
networking on exports is almost twice as large in the OLS models. Similarly, the impact on ROA is negative 
and statistically significant according to the OLS estimates, while always insignificant in all the FE models 
presented in the paper. Overall, these differences suggest that uncontrolled firm characteristics may have 
biased some of the results obtained in studies unable to rely on longitudinal data. Hence, unless differently 
stated, we focus on fixed-effect models in the rest of the paper’s tables. 
22 
 
Table 5: Effect of network agreements by firm’s dimension 
  Less than 50 employees   Between 50 - 250 employees 
VARIABLES VA ratio ROA Export share   VA ratio ROA Export share 
Networking 0.00672*** 0.000459 0.00356** 
 
-0.0000045 0.000143 0.0173*** 
 
(0.00446) (0.801) (0.0424) 
 
(0.984) (0.965) (0.00116) 
Size 0.106*** 0.0511** -0.0572*** 
 
0.112*** 0.141** -0.0113 
 
(0.00039) (0.0489) (0.000695) 
 
(0.00583) (0.0439) (0.660) 
Size squared -0.00454*** 0.000076 0.00238*** 
 
-0.000028** -0.00198 0.000565 
 
(0.00136) (0.925) (0.0000408) 
 
(0.0208) (0.334) (0.468) 
Age 0.00305*** -0.00542*** 0.00203*** 
 
-0.000369 -0.00399*** 0.00335*** 
 
(0.00627) (0.00432) (0.000810) 
 
(0.922) (0.00523) (0.00597) 
Vertical dis. -0.121** 0.0284*** 0.00464** 
 
-0.428*** 0.287*** 0.00764 
 
(0.0109) (0.00150) (0.0135) 
 
(0.0003) (0.000132) (0.342) 
Physical capital 
int. -0.000636** 0.00133** -0.0001 
 
-0.000540 0.00671*** -0.000182 
 
(0.0487) (0.0136) (0.834) 
 
(0.610) (0.000754) (0.831) 
Export share -0.0573*** -0.0288*** 
  
-0.0539*** -0.0299 
 
 
(0.000652) (0.00434) 
  
(0.000112) (0.399) 
 Export share sq. 0.0449*** 0.0462*** 
  
0.0438*** 0.0518 
 
 
(0.0 057) (0.00 43) 
  
(0.00039) (0.135) 
 Firm's fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.225 -0.627*** 0.337*** 
 
-0.439 -1.830*** 0.0806 
  (0.120) (0.00306) (0.00276)   (0.199) (0.00263) (0.708) 
Observations 
 
864,667 
 
  
 
82,330 
 R-squared 0.091 0.002 0.020 
 
0.213 0.037 0.026 
Number of firms 152,173                                15,449 
Robust p-val in parentheses. Standard Errors are clustered by two-digit NACE Code, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5.3 The role of the external context: geographical divide, market turbulence and 
industry classification 
The other aspects of interest relate to the influence of the external socioeconomic or 
technical environment in which firms operate. First, we consider economic and 
infrastructural differences across Italian macro-regions. Table 6 presents separate 
regressions for different Italian macro areas
9
: North-West, North-East, Centre and South 
Italy. The South of Italy is commonly considered as the most underdeveloped area, with 
lacking infrastructures and services for firms, the Centre represents an intermediate 
situation, while the North-East and the North-West are more developed and characterized 
by a prevalence of small and medium-large firms, respectively. Our results show that the 
effect of networking is not homogeneous across these geographical areas. While in the 
                                                          
9
 The approach of grouping firms according to 4 homogeneous socioeconomic subsystems is very common 
for empirical studies focusing on Italy. 
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North-West network agreements never affect significantly the economic outcome we are 
interested in, in the North-East the network advantage is found to be limited to export 
propensity. The situation changes dramatically if we consider the subsample of firms 
located in the Central and Southern regions of Italy: here, as expected, the positive 
outcome of networking is higher as compared to the general case. After entering networks, 
value added per unit of revenues increases by 0.009 in magnitude (with respect to 0.0055 
for whole sample), while export share increases by 0.08 (as compared to 0.0062 for the 
whole sample) in both central and southern Italy. Also in this case, the results on profits 
remain inconclusive, but the other findings for VA/S and export propensity support our 
hypothesis H3. We can conclude that formal network agreements are more effective in less 
developed areas, where sharing resources, information and experience represents a 
practical and cost-saving way for preventing isolation and for compensating the lack of 
infrastructure or services. 
Secondly, if the geographical divide proxies the economic and infrastructural context, we 
expect also that demand specificities may influence the potential outcome from 
networking. We use a measure of the volatility of sales at a fine-grained industry level for 
identifying firms that operate in more turbulent environments. In such sectors, we expect 
that networking can be particularly useful for collecting information, experience and 
sharing resources with the aim of reducing uncertainty and protect firms from sales 
fluctuations. We compute our volatility measure as the average standard deviation of year 
difference in log sales over the period 2005-2010.
10
 Each economic activity has been 
classified as high (low) volatile if the average standard deviation of log sales is above 
(below) the median computed across all activities. Table 7 shows the results from the 
subsamples of high/low volatility sectors. While the general positive effect of networking 
on valued added and export propensity is confirmed, firms operating on turbulent markets 
show a higher effect on value added (0.066 as compared to 0.041). Our interpretation of 
this latter finding is that the information/experience and resource flows partially protect 
networking firms from the negative effect of uncertainty. Conversely, our findings do not 
show a similar pattern for export shares, for which coefficients are similar across 
subsamples. 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Volatility has been calculated at the NACE 3-digit classification of economic activity (over 350 sectors). 
We used the entire AIDA dataset to compute this measure of volatility, using years before the introduction of 
the network contracts, in order to minimize endogeneity concerns. 
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Table 6: Effect of formal business network by geographical area 
  North-West Italy   North-East Italy   Centre Italy   South Italy 
VARIABLES VA/S ROA Exp   VA/S ROA Exp   VA/S ROA Exp   VA/S ROA Exp 
Networking 0.00185 0.00298 0.00400 
 
0.00372 -0.00297 0.00566** 
 
0.00926*** 0.00390 0.00825* 
 
0.0102** -0.00265 0.0083*** 
 
(0.456) (0.279) (0.252) 
 
(0.170) (0.358) (0.047) 
 
(0.009) (0.388) (0.0524) 
 
(0.0481) (0.612) (0.008) 
Size 0.067*** 0.0293 -0.037*** 
 
0.0717*** 0.0375 -0.059*** 
 
0.0868*** 0.0819 -0.041*** 
 
0.112*** 0.0772*** -0.0309*** 
 
(0.0015) (0.309) (0.0002) 
 
(0.0009) (0.347) (0.0026) 
 
(0.008) (0.119) (5.74e-08) 
 
(0.0001) (0.005) (0.003) 
Size squared -0.0025*** 0.00100 0.0016*** 
 
-0.0027*** 0.00072 0.0025*** 
 
-0.0039*** -0.000696 0.0018*** 
 
-0.005*** -0.00148 0.00126*** 
 
(0.002) (0.255) (0.003) 
 
(0.0028) (0.571) (0.0006) 
 
(0.002) (0.661) (0.007) 
 
(0.002) (0.122) (0.007) 
Age 0.0016*** -0.0052*** 0.00268*** 
 
0.0016*** -0.0047*** 0.00281*** 
 
0.0035*** -0.0069*** 0.0014*** 
 
0.0024*** -0.004*** 0.0009*** 
 
(0.004) (0.0006) (0.00037) 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
 
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.005) 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) 
Vertical disintegr. -0.305*** 0.0650*** 0.0148*** 
 
-0.283*** 0.076*** 0.0170*** 
 
-0.0612 0.0217* 0.00203 
 
-0.121*** 0.0217** 0.00195* 
 
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0005) 
 
(0.0024) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.116) (0.0689) (0.215) 
 
(0.00902) (0.0124) (0.0942) 
Physical capital 
int. 0.000471 0.00108* 0.00198 
 
-0.0019** 0.0031*** -0.0002 
 
-0.0023*** 0.0038*** 0.00125 
 
-0.0011*** 0.0006** -0.0017 
 
(0.134) (0.078) (0.644) 
 
(0.016) (0.0005) (0.650) 
 
(0.001) (0.008) (0.496) 
 
(0.0047) (0.046) (0.756) 
Export share -0.063*** -0.0556*** 
  
-0.0396*** -0.0329** 
  
-0.081*** -0.0126 
  
-0.052*** -0.00977 
 
 
(0.0033) (0.0023) 
  
(0.007) (0.0126) 
  
(0.001) (0.432) 
  
(0.0015) (0.622) 
 Export share sq. 0.061*** 0.087*** 
  
0.0312*** 0.0324* 
  
0.045*** 0.0202 
  
0.0460** 0.0204 
 
 
(0.0027) (0.0007) 
  
(0.004) (0.0919) 
  
(0.001) (0.241) 
  
(0.0120) (0.359) 
 Constant 0.0749 -0.539** 0.196*** 
 
0.0313 -0.621** 0.323*** 
 
-0.106 -0.888** 0.240*** 
 
-0.170 -0.7*** 0.187*** 
 
(0.630) (0.0214) (0.004) 
 
(0.815) (0.0485) (0.00884) 
 
(0.518) (0.0393) (0.000104) 
 
(0.353) (0.0006) (0.000160) 
Firm's fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 315,850 
 
243,537 
 
199,773 
 
187,837 
R-squared 0.184 0.003 0.023 
 
0.164 0.016 0.028 
 
0.06 0.002 0.016 
 
0.093 0.001 0.008 
Number of firms 53,821   41,599   35,937   36,265 
Robust p-values in parentheses. Standard Errors are clustered by two-digit NACE Code, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Effect of formal business network by industry-level sales volatility 
  Low volatility 
 
High volatility 
VARIABLES VA/S ROA Exp   VA/S ROA Exp 
Networking 0.00410* -0.00116 0.00549** 
 
0.00663** 0.00129 0.00585* 
 
(0.0757) (0.606) (0.0291) 
 
(0.0359) (0.646) (0.0772) 
Size 0.118*** 0.0477 -0.0808*** 
 
0.0652*** 0.0330 -0.0335*** 
 
(0.00053) (0.227) (0.00054) 
 
(0.00943) (0.256) (0.000916) 
Size squared -0.00447*** 0.000833 0.00340*** 
 
-0.00314*** 0.000486 0.00142*** 
 
(0.00035) (0.498) (0.0001) 
 
(0.000525) (0.592) (0.000710) 
Age 0.00279*** -0.00575*** 0.00281*** 
 
0.00281*** -0.00522*** 0.00152*** 
 
(0.00018) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
 
(0.00018) (0.0006) (0.00165) 
Vertical disintegr. -0.0891 0.0309** 0.00528 
 
-0.158*** 0.0322*** 0.00419** 
 
(0.179) (0.0453) (0.110) 
 
(0.00409) (0.00379) (0.0109) 
Physical capital int. -0.00174*** 0.00323*** -0.0049 
 
-0.000342 0.000940** 0.000016 
 
(0.00046) (0.000101) (0.985) 
 
(0.248) (0.0291) (0.562) 
Export share -0.0651*** -0.0470*** 
  
-0.0608*** -0.0270** 
 
 
(0.00069) (0.00291) 
  
(0.00018) (0.0188) 
 Export share sq. 0.0477*** 0.0511*** 
  
0.0491*** 0.0545*** 
 
 
(0.000868) (0.00442) 
  
(0.000704) (0.000612) 
 Constant -0.409*** -0.733** 0.469*** 
 
0.103 -0.470* 0.195*** 
 
(0.00312) (0.0236) (0.00084) 
 
(0.547) (0.0502) (0.000386) 
Firm's fixed effect yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
Observations 405,039 
 
541,958 
R-squared 0.061 0.002 0.031 
 
0.118 0.003 0.013 
Number of firms 69,854   97,768 
Robust p-values in parentheses. Standard Errors are clustered by two-digit NACE Code, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The last angle of the analysis is focused on the innovative/operative environment 
characterizing each industrial activity. To that respect, the quasi totality of SMEs in our 
sample
11
, are divided into four homogeneous groups of industries (i.e. Science Based, 
Specialized Suppliers, Scale and Information Intensity and Supplier Dominated), following 
the well known Pavitt’s taxonomy. Table 8 presents the results separately for the four sub-
samples. We can observe that the structural characteristics of the industry influence the 
outcomes of networking, even after accounting for firms’ and years’ fixed effects. The 
large majority of Italian SMEs operate in the specialized suppliers or supplier dominated 
sectors, in line with the view that Italian firms are more focused on traditional industries 
than other countries (Germany, France and the UK, for example).  
 
 
                                                          
11
 Many different works adopt the Pavitt’s taxonomy for classifying sectors according to their main 
innovation characteristics (see Archibugi, 2001). Bogliacino and Pianta (2015) have recently extended the 
Pavitt’s taxonomy in order to classify both manufacturing industries and service sectors. 
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Table 8: Effect of network agreements by industries classified according to the Pavitt taxonomy 
  Science Based   Specialized suppliers   Scale and information intensive   Supplier dominated 
VARIABLES VA/S ROA Exp   VA/S ROA Exp   VA/S ROA Exp   VA/S ROA Exp 
Networking -0.00297 -0.0051 0.000289 
 
0.00929* 0.0119*** 0.00694 
 
0.00534 0.000910 0.00110 
 
0.00412 -0.000139 0.00844*** 
 
(0.196) (0.172) (0.757) 
 
(0.0566) (0.00248) (0.104) 
 
(0.245) (0.839) (0.842) 
 
(0.145) (0.945) (0.00198) 
Size 0.0181 -0.0104 -0.0668** 
 
0.0602 0.0132 -0.0661*** 
 
0.0640*** 0.114 -0.055*** 
 
0.0876*** 0.0522 -0.0454*** 
 
(0.189) (0.655) (0.0170) 
 
(0.218) (0.856) (0.0035) 
 
(0.00630) (0.208) (0.001) 
 
(0.00566) (0.201) (0.00938) 
Size squared -0.000125 0.0021** 0.00276*** 
 
-0.00254 0.00166 0.0028*** 
 
-0.0019*** -0.0013 0.0024*** 
 
-0.0036*** 0.00024 0.0019*** 
 
(0.768) (0.0481) (0.00846) 
 
(0.180) (0.490) (0.005) 
 
(0.00620) (0.589) (0.0001) 
 
(0.000473) (0.848) (0.00295) 
Age 0.000467 -0.0055** 0.00274 
 
0.00221** -0.007*** 0.004** 
 
0.00321 -0.0046** 0.0033*** 
 
0.0025*** -0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.528) (0.0367) (0.116) 
 
(0.0467) (0.0003) (0.035) 
 
(0.634) (0.01) (0.00159) 
 
(0.000871) (0.000166) (0.00201) 
Vertical disinteg. -0.649*** 0.0980*** 0.0335* 
 
-0.297** 0.0479** 0.014*** 
 
-0.389*** 0.0237 0.0110** 
 
-0.0681* 0.0317** 0.0042* 
 
(0.00150) (0.00422) (0.0677) 
 
(0.0243) (0.0141) (0.009) 
 
(0.0005) (0.735) (0.0366) 
 
(0.0948) (0.0218) (0.0735) 
Physical capital 
int. -0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0019 
 
-0.0034*** 0.004*** -0.00011 
 
-0.0029** 0.0066*** -0.0004 
 
-0.0006 0.0029*** 0.008 
 
(0.00570) (0.0081) (0.721) 
 
(0.000539) (0.0012) (0.803) 
 
(0.0392) (0.0014) (0.327) 
 
(0.429) (0.000531) (0.595) 
Export share -0.0726** -0.113*** 
  
-0.0702*** -0.0482*** 
  
-0.05*** -0.0901 
  
-0.0529*** -0.0214* 
 
 
(0.0107) (0.0007) 
  
(0.00206) (0.0009) 
  
(0.0001) (0.130) 
  
(2.74e-05) (0.0557) 
 Export share sq. 0.0703*** 0.125** 
  
0.0596*** 0.0635*** 
  
0.0472*** 0.0980* 
  
0.0343*** 0.0290** 
 
 
(0.00712) (0.0147) 
  
(0.00284) (0.0003) 
  
(0.0001) (0.0850) 
  
(0.00283) (0.0461) 
 Constant 0.545*** -0.212 0.384* 
 
0.192 -0.396 0.371*** 
 
0.0757 -1.250* 0.294** 
 
-0.202 -0.708** 0.255** 
 
(0.00116) (0.273) (0.0706) 
 
(0.581) (0.467) (0.0002) 
 
(0.547) (0.0765) (0.0259) 
 
(0.367) (0.0368) (0.0249) 
Firm's fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,588 
 
130,264 
 
86,016 
 
484,647 
R-squared 0.47 0.055 0.036 
 
0.192 0.016 0.033 
 
0.194 0.001 0.031 
 
0.052 0.002 0.02 
Number of firms 7,278   23,069   14,590   85,613 
Robust p-values in parentheses. Standard Errors are clustered by two-digit NACE Code, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The estimates reported in table 8 highlight that firms operating in specialized suppliers 
industries benefit more from network agreements. For such firms, entering a network 
implies an increase in value added per unit of revenues (+ 0.009), an increase in export 
share (+0.007) and, rather surprisingly, an increase in ROA (+0.01). In all cases, the 
impact is higher with respect to the results for the whole sample. Similar considerations, 
but limited to the case of the export share, are also valid for supplier dominated industries, 
in which networking is found to increase the propensity to export: the coefficient (0.008) is 
larger than the one recorded for the whole sample. Therefore, contrary to expectations, 
only firms operating in more traditional sectors seems to benefit from networking, at least 
in the short and medium period; as a consequence, our findings do not lend support to 
hypothesis H4.  
 
5.4 Strong and weak ties: the role of industrial districts 
Networking is a multifaceted phenomenon, as highlighted in the literature review, and the 
presence of formal network agreements cannot exclude the existence of other weaker ties 
among firms. The interaction of multiple level of networking offers a new interesting angle 
of analysis, which has been rarely investigated in the past. In our case, the signature of 
formal contracts (Reti d’impresa) is not limited by any economical/geographical clause or 
by any pre-existing kind of cooperation. We exploit this by adding into the analysis the 
presence of industrial cluster (labeled districts), a specificity of the Italian production 
system. Industrial districts, clearly identified by ISTAT (the official Italian statistical 
institute) are well defined geographical areas with strong industrial specializations and 
strong cohesion at social/institutional level. Such local areas are characterized by stronger 
cooperation among firms, typically promoted by local institutions, generating links that 
resemble closely the weak ties identified by Li et al., (2015) for industrial clusters. Some 
firms which are already cooperating through weak ties may decide to strengthen and 
formalize the relationship by adhering to the “reti d’impresa” scheme. In order to account 
for the differential impact of formal network agreements, we split our sample in two 
groups: firms operating into industrial districts and firms operating outside industrial 
districts.  
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Table 9: Interaction between formal business networks and industrial clusters / districts 
  Firms outside industrial clusters 
 
Firms inside industrial clusters 
VARIABLES VA/S ROA Exp  VA/S ROA Exp 
Networking 0.00609*** 0.00118 0.00528* 
 
0.00361 -0.00178 0.00689** 
 
(0.00502) (0.574) (0.0529) 
 
(0.290) (0.571) (0.0297) 
Size 0.0869*** 0.0427* -0.0427*** 
 
0.0526*** 0.0108 -0.0522*** 
 
(0.008) (0.0961) (0.0012) 
 
(0.00458) (0.750) (0.00203) 
Size squared -0.00381*** 0.000379 0.00176*** 
 
-0.00226*** 0.00157 0.00243*** 
 
(0.0068) (0.635) (0.0086) 
 
(0.00752) (0.171) (0.0072) 
Age 0.00294*** -0.00572*** 0.00161*** 
 
0.00214*** -0.00434*** 0.00347*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0202) (0.003) 
 
(0.00023) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
Vertical disintegr. -0.113** 0.0281*** 0.00277** 
 
-0.247*** 0.0591*** 0.0229*** 
 
(0.0165) (0.00284) (0.0258) 
 
(0.0032) (0.00186) (0.0045) 
Physical capital int. -0.00105*** 0.00154** 0.0036 
 
-0.00512 0.000948* -0.00190 
 
(0.00434) (0.0177) (0.507) 
 
(0.988) (0.0812) (0.871) 
Export share -0.0607*** -0.0361** 
  
-0.0548*** -0.0356*** 
 
 
(0.0045) (0.0100) 
  
(0.0019) (0.000347) 
 Export share sq. 0.0482*** 0.0587*** 
  
0.0432*** 0.0419*** 
 
 
(0.0012) (0.000633) 
  
(0.0034) (0.0082) 
 Firm's fixed effect yes Yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
Year fixed effect yes Yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
Constant -0.0877 -0.572*** 0.258*** 
 
0.167 -0.404 0.245** 
  (0.545) (0.00662) (0.0027)  (0.208) (0.126) (0.0443) 
Observations 690,473 690,430 690,473 
 
256,525 256,507 256,525 
R-squared 0.085 0.002 0.015 
 
0.147 0.037 0.034 
Number of firms 125,053 125,051 125,053  42,569 42,569 42,569 
Robust p-values in parentheses. Standard Errors are clustered by two-digit NACE Code, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 9 shows that firms located outside industrial districts strongly benefit from 
networking both in term of value added and export share, while for firms located inside 
industrial districts the effect on VA/S disappears. Finally, the usual negligible effect on 
profits is confirmed for both subsamples. Our findings confirm that if firms are already 
cooperating, the effect of formal agreements is lower, in line with our hypothesis H5. In 
addition, the main driver for entering formal networks seems to be the desire to increase 
exports.  
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5.5 Network characteristics and partners’ economic performances  
The previous sections suggest that network agreements sustain value added creation and 
export propensity, but some important aspects regarding the structural characteristics of the 
network are worth to be investigated. We tackle the issue by running separate OLS 
estimates, as explained on the methodological part, on the subsample of firms entering a 
network agreement during the period under investigation. The size of the sample decreases 
dramatically, since only firms that enter a network agreement before 31/12/2013 have been 
included
12
. We use the number of members as a measure of network size, while we 
measure network dispersion as the number of provinces in which firms operate divided the 
total number of members. Finally, we compute network diversity as the number of 
different sectors (NACE two-digit codes) involved divided by the number of members. 
Table 10 reports the estimated coefficients for the three variables of interest, (i.e. network 
size, diversity, and dispersion) following an empirical specification very rich in terms of 
control variables. We include many interactions dummies isolating the effect of a time 
specific trend in particular industries (years/two-digit NACE codes interactions) as well as 
regional time specific trends (years-regions interactions), in order to remove all potential 
heterogeneity left by the absence of firm fixed effects.  
Table 10: Performance and partner diversity in terms of geographical and activity 
dispersion  
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES VA/S ROA Exp   VA/S ROA Exp   VA/S ROA Exp 
Network size 0.00014*** 0.00023*** 0.00002 
        
 
(0.0072) (0.000720) (0.837) 
        Network Diversity 
    
0.0034 -0.0047* -0.0038 
    
     
(0.145) (0.067) (0.45) 
    Network Dispersion 
        
-0.0005 -0.0014 -0.014*** 
        
 
   
 
(0.823) (0.578) (0.0018) 
Controls (from table 8) Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year-sector (2 digit) Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Regions Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations firms-years 21,929 21,927 21,929   21,929 21,927 21,929   21,929 21,927 21,929 
Robust p-val in parentheses. SE are clustered by two-digit NACE Code, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Control variables are the same reported in table8. Estimates using OLS method with interaction dummies 
 
 
                                                          
12
 This is because for firms entering a network in 2014 we cannot collect financial statement information for 
year 2015. 
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Table 10, columns 1-3, report the results about the impact of network size on value added, 
profits and exports, respectively. The number of partners positively influences VA per unit 
of revenues as well as profitability (ROA). The small magnitude of the coefficient 
represents the marginal effect from increasing by one member the number of firms 
involved in the network. This evidence is substantially in line with the results by Lechner 
et al. (2006) and Goerzen and Beamish (2005), who both show a positive effect of network 
size on the economic performance of network members. On the contrary, larger networks 
(in terms of number of network participants) seem to be less effective in increasing the 
export share. Overall, we can conclude that size has a positive effect on performance, 
lending support to our hypothesis H6a. Considering the indicator of network diversity, the 
results are only significant for the profitability ratio, and show a negative impact of 
diversity on ROA. Our findings confirm the ones reported by Goerzen and Beamish (2005) 
and by Parida et. al (2016), and are partially supporting hypothesis H6b. Finally, the last 3 
columns of table 10 show that the increasing geographical distance among partners does 
not reduce performance in terms of value added and profitability, but seems to reduce the 
incentive for network members to sell abroad. After entering highly dispersed networks, 
firms seem to prefer to exploit new national markets that become accessible through 
networking, instead of selling in foreign markets. This is an interesting pattern, which has 
never been highlighted in the literature: when the geographical dispersion increases, the 
impact of networking on export share is negative. Overall, our results are only partially 
supporting our last hypothesis H6c.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a large-scale empirical analysis of the effects of membership in formal 
business networks on firms’ performance. We analyze a representative and longitudinal 
sample of Italian SMEs (i.e. firms employing between 10 and 250 employees), for which 
we have collected financial statements, export data and information on membership in 
business networks, for the years 2008-2014. Our econometric analyses estimate the short 
term consequences, in terms of firm economic performance, from entering a specific type 
of formal business network agreement, the so-called “Reti d’impresa”, recently introduced 
in Italy. Such a network contract provides a precise and well defined definition of the 
network relationship, aimed at “bringing together firms to co-produce, co-market, co-
purchase or co-operate in product or marked development”. The main advantage is a clear 
distinction among firms included and those not included into the definition of formal 
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network. Moreover, the explicit cooperation in production or marketing activities is the 
only aim of the contract, without any other kind of public support or interaction with other 
policy interventions (e.g. training) that might make it difficult to isolate the specific effects 
of the networking agreements. To eliminate, or at least reduce, the bias in the estimated 
impacts potentially arising from the non-random selection of specific firm types into 
networking - a selection likely to be driven by firms’ unobservable characteristics - we rely 
on a fixed effect estimator that purges from firm time-invariant specificities. We adopt 
three different measures of performance: value added per unit of revenues, profitability 
(i.e. return on assets) and export intensity (i.e. export over revenues). We find a general 
positive and significant effect of formal network agreements on both value added and 
export shares, but no discernible effect on profits. We then investigate the influence of the 
socio-economic environment and of various firm’s observable characteristics on the 
estimated impact of membership in formal network agreements. First, by splitting our 
sample into small (less than 50 employees) and large SMEs, we find that networking 
increases value added for small SMEs, while the effect on export shares is higher for large 
SMEs. Second, we find that the advantages from networking are stronger, in terms of both 
value added and export propensity, for firms located in more underdeveloped areas. 
Finally, investigating differences across industries through the Pavitt’s taxonomy, we 
observe that the results on value added and export share are mainly driven by firms 
operating in more traditional sectors (i.e., specialized suppliers or supplier-dominated 
industries).  
Our empirical evidence seems to support the idea that networks are more beneficial for 
firms operating in less favorable environments or characterized by an intrinsic weakness. 
In this sense, stimulating resources sharing, as well as firms’ interactions or information 
exchanges trough networking, can be a win-win opportunity for the Italian SMEs. On the 
one hand, networking can represent an alternative to dimensional growth in order to reach 
a critical mass of resources, information and experiences. On the other hand, networks can 
represent a valid way to overcome the lack of infrastructures and isolation, which are 
typical problems of less developed areas.  
Similarly, networking seems to be a valid instrument for sustaining performance in case of 
highly turbulent environments. Our estimates highlight that when the volatility of sales is 
high, formal networks are more effective in increasing value added, while the effects on 
export propensity are not different with respect to the ones reported for more stable sectors. 
Another important contribution of our work is the explicit consideration of the overlap 
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between weak and strong forms of networking. Taking advantage of the Italian industrial 
structure, we identify well defined local areas (the so-called industrial districts) 
characterized by a high level of relatively weak forms of cooperation among firms. Our 
results show that formalizing network agreements through contracts has a higher impact on 
value added for firms localized outside industrial districts. 
Finally, the results regarding other structural aspects of networks, like the number of ties, 
partner diversity and geographical dispersion, are mixed. Network size shows a positive 
effect on value added ratio and profits, while network diversity is confirmed as a critical 
aspect that is negatively related to profits. The geographical dispersion shows a negligible 
effect on value added ratio and profits, but seems also to limit the pressure for international 
sales.  
The fact that we focus on a specific kind of formal business network represents both a 
strength and a weakness of our analysis: we are able to clearly observe the moment in 
which the network is formalized, and its main characteristics, but our data do not allow us 
to identify other kinds of formal and/or informal cooperation that are not embedded under 
the term Reti d’impresa. In fact, our study is entirely focused on the differential in 
performances coming from the formalization of networking activities (e.g., pre-existing 
forms of collaboration of firms within industrial district). Our results lend support to the 
idea that declaring and formalizing objectives through a contract helps firms to benefit 
from networking activities (Huggins, 2001). However, since we cannot observe a firm’s 
participation in other formal agreements, such as joint ventures, supplying contracts or 
franchising relationships, our estimates may represent a lower bound of the true impact of 
formal networking on firms’ performance. Moreover, at the present stage of research, we 
are only able to catch short-term effects, due to the fact that a consistent group of firms 
enter network agreements only after 2012, leaving us with just two years of data in the 
post-network period. Notice, also, that the observations for the years after entering a 
network agreement partly overlap with the recent economic crisis, and it would therefore 
be of interest to assess whether this too is leading us to underestimate the effects that 
would prevail under normal times. Finally, even if we believe that our estimation 
techniques are broadly appropriate for attenuating any concern related to omitted variable 
biases and self-selection into treatment status, it is perhaps worth remembering that our 
results are, nevertheless, obtained from observational data; hence, an interpretation in 
terms of direct causality between networking and economic performance should still be 
taken with care and further assessed in future research endeavors.  
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